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| Psychology of Downgrading Crime |
When you become a police officer, you're
going to have to be careful about falling
into a psychology of downgrading crime
which has become prevalent in many police
departments across the country.
In 1966, a fellow named Donald D.
Pomerleau became the Police
Commissioner for Baltimore City,
Maryland. The Baltimore Police
Department was about to be transformed
into a modern police department utilizing
modern equipment and methods. One of
the methods would be a sophisticated crime
reporting system. Pomerleau made it very
clear that Baltimore was about to
experience a dramatic increase in crime;
not because there would be an actual
going to have to be careful about falling
into a psychology of downgrading crime
which has become prevalent in many police
departments across the country.
In 1966, a fellow named Donald D.
Pomerleau became the Police
Commissioner for Baltimore City,
Maryland. The Baltimore Police
Department was about to be transformed
into a modern police department utilizing
modern equipment and methods. One of
the methods would be a sophisticated crime
reporting system. Pomerleau made it very
clear that Baltimore was about to
experience a dramatic increase in crime;
not because there would be an actual
increase of crime, but simply because crime would now be accurately
reported.
To be fair to the Police Chiefs of today, Pomerleau enjoyed a unique
position in the political scheme of things. Pomerleau was appointed by
the Governor of Maryland instead of the Mayor of Baltimore, an
appointment arrangement which existed from the American Civil War
until the late 1970's. During Pomerleau's administration, he was
generally scorned by Baltimore's politicians, because he was insulated
from their influence. However, that insulation provided Pomerleau the
ability to create and maintain an incredibly efficient police department,
and a second to none crime reporting system.
I landed on the scene in 1971. Looking back, I can appreciate the
amazing progress Pomerleau had achieved in those few years between
1966 and 1971. Did I mention that Pomerleau was a retired Marine?
Anyway, I couldn't believe how everything was so tightly controlled.
When you're young, as I was, you believe that you're a lot smarter than
you are. It's just a natural phenomenon of youth to make one
overestimate one's intelligence and one's ability to be clever. In
Pomerleau's world, those excesses were not good things. In fact, acting
from those excesses ended many police careers in the Baltimore Police
Department.
When it came to reporting crime, the FBI's UCR (Uniform Crime
Reporting) was the department's Bible for crime reporting. Every
incident report went through a Staff Review Process. The Staff Review
Section was comprised of sworn and civilian personnel whose only
purpose for being was to make certain that the department's reporting
system maintained strict adherence to the UCR. The men and women
of Staff Review were really good at their jobs, and the smartest and the
cleverest couldn't get anything by them. They made it easy for police
officers as well. If an officer in the field came upon something that
seemed a little complicated, Staff Review was a 24/7 operation, and it
was only a phone call away.
Pomerleau had a really bad attitude toward those who didn't take
integrity seriously. He had a zero tolerance level when it came to police
officers who submitted false reports in any form including crime reports
where police officers would knowingly and purposely downgrade a crime
report by overtly lying or lying by omission. When a police officer was
found guilty in an administrative hearing of submitting a false report,
the punishment was universal and unyielding... the officer was FIRED!
Pomerleau's reasoning, regarding false reports, was pretty simple. He
equated an administrative conviction for false report with a criminal
conviction for perjury. With the latter, a person convicted of perjury
cannot testify as a witness in a criminal proceeding... that's why you'll
see precious few prosecutions for perjury. While a police officer can
testify in court with an administrative conviction for false report lurking
in his or her personnel file, the defense attorney who learns of the
conviction will make that officer's testimony totally useless.
It turns out that Pomerleau's reasoning was pretty sound. As of 2008,
the Baltimore State's Attorney's Office maintains a list of over 100
active police officers. It's called the "Do Not Call List." This infamous
list contains the names of police officers administratively convicted for
false reports or where prosecutors have determined, by other means,
that an officer(s) is not credible. In cases where an officer on the list is
the primary, or only, witness for the State, the case is dropped, and all
charges against the defendant dismissed.
Donald Pomerleau left the Baltimore Police Department in 1981. The
stability of the department for the following ten years was a tribute to
Pomerleau's tenure. Succeeding police commissioners were appointed
from a cadre left behind by the long serving police commissioner. The
operational and administrative functions of the department didn't
change very much; however, the politicians were quick to take
advantage of Pomerleau's departure, and the return of the appointment
process for the police commissioner to the Mayor and City Council of
Baltimore. Changes that occurred during those ten years were not
progressive; however, the most important functions remained pretty
well intact, and the Staff Review Section was still operating efficiently.
After 1991, the Baltimore Police Department caught the Change Virus
along with everyone else, and it began it's operational and
administrative decline.
Here's what you have to remember when you become a police officer.
No matter how smart you think you are, you're going to have a lot to
learn. If you join a police department that is operating at top efficiency,
your continuing education will be structured, and you'll come to
understand and appreciate the importance of every organizational
component. However, the quality of your education will depend upon
the quality of every one of the organizational components.
Not surprisingly, police officers generally don't appreciate the absolute
importance of administrative functions that support their operational
missions. When I became a police officer, everybody complained about
having to write too many reports. When it came to incidents classified
as Part I offenses under UCR, a Baltimore police officer had to write a
report even when no victim(s), witness(es), or other evidence could be
found to support the reported incident to explain that circumstance(s).
The purpose of writing those reports was simply a constant reminder to
every police officer that the integrity of the department's reporting
system was important. For example, if you improperly downgraded a
Part I incident when, in fact, information or evidence supported the Part
I classification... shame on you if you were caught lying on that report.
There are plenty of important administrative functions within a police
department, but I can't think of any that are more important than a
department's crime reporting system. When you become a police
officer, you must prepare yourself for the possibility of encountering
some pretty strange interpretations of UCR.
Imagine yourself as a new police officer sitting at roll call during your
first week out of the academy. Your shift commander is conducting the
roll call, and he's addressing the reporting of aggravated assaults [a Part
I offense under UCR]. The lieutenant identifies a specific incident of
assault; wherein, a person is stabbed during the assault. The shift
commander instructs his shift to classify a stabbing, when the injury is
not life threatening, as a common assault [a Part II offense under UCR,
and one that no one really cares about].
Even though you're brand new, you've been reading the UCR, and you
immediately recognize that the lieutenant is wrong. What do you do?
Do you follow your lieutenant's instruction when you handle a stabbing
incident, or do you properly classify the incident as an aggravated
assault? After all, your department purports to adhere to the UCR. If
you join a police department that has a high quality reporting system in
place, you wouldn't receive such flawed instruction. Even if you did get
such direction, and you followed it, your report would eventually be
returned to you for correction.
But, let's look at the other officers on your shift. How many of the
officers do you think would follow this shift commander's direction to
improperly downgrade the aggravated assault to common assault? Or,
what about the sergeants? The sergeants will be reviewing such
reports. Are the sergeants in agreement with the lieutenant? If you
were to find yourself in such a situation where your shift commander
would so publicly give such a direction, you could well be the only police
officer in the room having a problem with the direction.
Here's an even more important question. Why is the lieutenant
applying his own criteria, which is so clearly wrong, into UCR? Is the
lieutenant stupid? Does this lieutenant give questionable direction on
other matters? The most probable explanation is that the lieutenant
knows exactly what he's doing. The really scary thing about this
scenario is that the lieutenant wouldn't be telling you to downgrade
stabbing incidents; unless, he feels confident that there'll be no
objections from commanders farther up the chain of command.
It's all about looking good. UCR Part I crime classification is the
measure by which police departments measure their success in reducing
crime. It's also a measure of success for commanders and supervisors
operating in their own little corner of the universe. Whenever a police
chief demands crime reduction without creating, implementing,
maintaining, and demanding a crime reporting system with real quality
control features – police officers, supervisors, and commanders will
define the UCR any way they want. This is the psychology of
downgrading crime.
reported.
To be fair to the Police Chiefs of today, Pomerleau enjoyed a unique
position in the political scheme of things. Pomerleau was appointed by
the Governor of Maryland instead of the Mayor of Baltimore, an
appointment arrangement which existed from the American Civil War
until the late 1970's. During Pomerleau's administration, he was
generally scorned by Baltimore's politicians, because he was insulated
from their influence. However, that insulation provided Pomerleau the
ability to create and maintain an incredibly efficient police department,
and a second to none crime reporting system.
I landed on the scene in 1971. Looking back, I can appreciate the
amazing progress Pomerleau had achieved in those few years between
1966 and 1971. Did I mention that Pomerleau was a retired Marine?
Anyway, I couldn't believe how everything was so tightly controlled.
When you're young, as I was, you believe that you're a lot smarter than
you are. It's just a natural phenomenon of youth to make one
overestimate one's intelligence and one's ability to be clever. In
Pomerleau's world, those excesses were not good things. In fact, acting
from those excesses ended many police careers in the Baltimore Police
Department.
When it came to reporting crime, the FBI's UCR (Uniform Crime
Reporting) was the department's Bible for crime reporting. Every
incident report went through a Staff Review Process. The Staff Review
Section was comprised of sworn and civilian personnel whose only
purpose for being was to make certain that the department's reporting
system maintained strict adherence to the UCR. The men and women
of Staff Review were really good at their jobs, and the smartest and the
cleverest couldn't get anything by them. They made it easy for police
officers as well. If an officer in the field came upon something that
seemed a little complicated, Staff Review was a 24/7 operation, and it
was only a phone call away.
Pomerleau had a really bad attitude toward those who didn't take
integrity seriously. He had a zero tolerance level when it came to police
officers who submitted false reports in any form including crime reports
where police officers would knowingly and purposely downgrade a crime
report by overtly lying or lying by omission. When a police officer was
found guilty in an administrative hearing of submitting a false report,
the punishment was universal and unyielding... the officer was FIRED!
Pomerleau's reasoning, regarding false reports, was pretty simple. He
equated an administrative conviction for false report with a criminal
conviction for perjury. With the latter, a person convicted of perjury
cannot testify as a witness in a criminal proceeding... that's why you'll
see precious few prosecutions for perjury. While a police officer can
testify in court with an administrative conviction for false report lurking
in his or her personnel file, the defense attorney who learns of the
conviction will make that officer's testimony totally useless.
It turns out that Pomerleau's reasoning was pretty sound. As of 2008,
the Baltimore State's Attorney's Office maintains a list of over 100
active police officers. It's called the "Do Not Call List." This infamous
list contains the names of police officers administratively convicted for
false reports or where prosecutors have determined, by other means,
that an officer(s) is not credible. In cases where an officer on the list is
the primary, or only, witness for the State, the case is dropped, and all
charges against the defendant dismissed.
Donald Pomerleau left the Baltimore Police Department in 1981. The
stability of the department for the following ten years was a tribute to
Pomerleau's tenure. Succeeding police commissioners were appointed
from a cadre left behind by the long serving police commissioner. The
operational and administrative functions of the department didn't
change very much; however, the politicians were quick to take
advantage of Pomerleau's departure, and the return of the appointment
process for the police commissioner to the Mayor and City Council of
Baltimore. Changes that occurred during those ten years were not
progressive; however, the most important functions remained pretty
well intact, and the Staff Review Section was still operating efficiently.
After 1991, the Baltimore Police Department caught the Change Virus
along with everyone else, and it began it's operational and
administrative decline.
Here's what you have to remember when you become a police officer.
No matter how smart you think you are, you're going to have a lot to
learn. If you join a police department that is operating at top efficiency,
your continuing education will be structured, and you'll come to
understand and appreciate the importance of every organizational
component. However, the quality of your education will depend upon
the quality of every one of the organizational components.
Not surprisingly, police officers generally don't appreciate the absolute
importance of administrative functions that support their operational
missions. When I became a police officer, everybody complained about
having to write too many reports. When it came to incidents classified
as Part I offenses under UCR, a Baltimore police officer had to write a
report even when no victim(s), witness(es), or other evidence could be
found to support the reported incident to explain that circumstance(s).
The purpose of writing those reports was simply a constant reminder to
every police officer that the integrity of the department's reporting
system was important. For example, if you improperly downgraded a
Part I incident when, in fact, information or evidence supported the Part
I classification... shame on you if you were caught lying on that report.
There are plenty of important administrative functions within a police
department, but I can't think of any that are more important than a
department's crime reporting system. When you become a police
officer, you must prepare yourself for the possibility of encountering
some pretty strange interpretations of UCR.
Imagine yourself as a new police officer sitting at roll call during your
first week out of the academy. Your shift commander is conducting the
roll call, and he's addressing the reporting of aggravated assaults [a Part
I offense under UCR]. The lieutenant identifies a specific incident of
assault; wherein, a person is stabbed during the assault. The shift
commander instructs his shift to classify a stabbing, when the injury is
not life threatening, as a common assault [a Part II offense under UCR,
and one that no one really cares about].
Even though you're brand new, you've been reading the UCR, and you
immediately recognize that the lieutenant is wrong. What do you do?
Do you follow your lieutenant's instruction when you handle a stabbing
incident, or do you properly classify the incident as an aggravated
assault? After all, your department purports to adhere to the UCR. If
you join a police department that has a high quality reporting system in
place, you wouldn't receive such flawed instruction. Even if you did get
such direction, and you followed it, your report would eventually be
returned to you for correction.
But, let's look at the other officers on your shift. How many of the
officers do you think would follow this shift commander's direction to
improperly downgrade the aggravated assault to common assault? Or,
what about the sergeants? The sergeants will be reviewing such
reports. Are the sergeants in agreement with the lieutenant? If you
were to find yourself in such a situation where your shift commander
would so publicly give such a direction, you could well be the only police
officer in the room having a problem with the direction.
Here's an even more important question. Why is the lieutenant
applying his own criteria, which is so clearly wrong, into UCR? Is the
lieutenant stupid? Does this lieutenant give questionable direction on
other matters? The most probable explanation is that the lieutenant
knows exactly what he's doing. The really scary thing about this
scenario is that the lieutenant wouldn't be telling you to downgrade
stabbing incidents; unless, he feels confident that there'll be no
objections from commanders farther up the chain of command.
It's all about looking good. UCR Part I crime classification is the
measure by which police departments measure their success in reducing
crime. It's also a measure of success for commanders and supervisors
operating in their own little corner of the universe. Whenever a police
chief demands crime reduction without creating, implementing,
maintaining, and demanding a crime reporting system with real quality
control features – police officers, supervisors, and commanders will
define the UCR any way they want. This is the psychology of
downgrading crime.
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